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APPLYING JUST WAR JUS IN BELLO DOCTRINE
TO REPRISALS: AN AFGHAN HYPOTHETICAL
Michael F. Noone, Jr.'
In the Pathan country, the presence of women and children in
a village may be taken as a sure sign that the men belonging to it
do not mean to fight. The fact need not of course influence the
decision to destroy it....'
Most [Taliban field commanders] have never heard of
international treaties on the treatment of POWs. For them, you
are just infidels invading their land.
Father Schall surmises that American prisoners of Taliban forces
might be tortured. I expected that American prisoners would be killed.
As this is written, Northern Alliance successes have diminished either
possibility. However, the threat remains both in Afghanistan and in
other parts of the world in which U.S. Forces, trained to observe the law
of war, will face warriors, not soldiers.3 The practices of the Taliban were
graphically described by Milt Bearden who retired from the CIA in 1994
after spending thirty years in Clandestine Services and directing the final
years of the Agency's covert war in Afghanistan. Bearden wrote The
Black Tulip, a novel based on his Afghan experiences, when he retired.
Early in the novel Taliban warriors ambush four Soviet soldiers, two of
whom survive the attack. One of the Taliban, Salahuddin, approaches a
survivor who:
[S]lowly raised his hands above his head in a primordial state
of submission and settled into a sitting position on his knees...
Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
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1. MAJOR C.E. CALLWELL, SMALL WARS: THEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 269
(1899).
2. Timothy Gusinov, Soviet 'deja vu' Offers U.S. Aid in Afghanistan, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 3, 2001 at A6. Former Soviet Major Timothy Gusinov served nine years in
Afghanistan.
3. See generally HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH, PRIMITIVE WAR: ITS PRACTICE
AND CONCEPTS (2d ed. 1971) (drawing the distinction based on tactics and behavior).
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Salahuddin moved his face close to the young soldier's
trembling lips and smiled reassuringly, even gently. He brushed
his lips against the young man's forehead and tenderly slipped
the V formed by the outstretched thumb and index finger of his
left hand under the soldier's jaw. He tilted the soldier's blond
head slightly upward and squeezed his neck firmly. When he
was satisfied with the tension in the soldier's neck muscles,
Salahuddin drew his long bladed knife from its scabbard, and in
a single fluid motion cut the young man's throat and pushed his
head down away from his knees to direct the pulsing lines of
blood away from his own feet and legs. He closed his eyes and
sang out softly, "Allah hu akhbar. God is great.,
4
The tone of the description suggests that Bearden had seen such an
event. Similar evidence is offered by Richard Kidd who provided relief
to refugees along the Afghan-Tajiki border in 1993 and returned to
Afghanistan in 1998-1999 when he served as Planning and Operations
Manager of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
to Afghanistan. He reported that during his stays there, videotapes of
the murder of a captured Soviet helicopter pilot were still circulating.5
When the first U.S. prisoner's throat is cut in Afghanistan or in some
other primitive war, and that film is released, the American public will
demand retaliation. The law of armed conflict rejects revenge as a
motivating factor but permits reprisals, which the U.S. Army defines as:
acts of retaliation in the form of conduct which would otherwise
be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent against enemy
personnel or property for acts of warfare committed by the
other belligerent in violation of the law of war, for the purpose
of enforcing future compliance with the recognized rules of
civilized warfare.6
An act of reprisal is intended to coerce the enemy to change its
4. MILTON BEARDEN, THE BLACK TULIP 36 (1998).
5. Conversation with the author; see also Richard Kidd, How Afghan Men Fight, at
http://www.csmonitor.com/cgi-bin/getrasciiarchive?script/2001/10/01/pl Issl.txt (Oct. 1,
2001) ("We may see videos of American prisoners being killed."); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE
CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 23 n.22 (2d ed. 2000) ("During the civil war
in Afghanistan there were reports that Russian soldiers supporting the government
captured by the mujahudin were frequently killed if they refused conversion."). "Soviet
soldiers captured during their war in the 1980s were frequently staked out, sliced open and
left to die slowly beneath the merciless Afghan sun, according to Western witnesses with
the mujahedin at the time." Ken Ringle, A 4,000-Year History of Glory and Blood,
WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at C4. See generally SVETLANA ALEXIEVICH, ZINKY Boys:
SOVIET VOICES FROM THE AFGHANISTAN WALL (U.S. ed. 1992) (describing Afghan
atrocities and Russian retaliation).
6. Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 177 (1956).
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behavior. In the philosopher Michael Walzer's words, "[it] is
characterized by a certain posture of looking back, acting after, which
implies a willingness not to act at all, to abide by some set of restraints,"7
and "[t]he backward-looking characteristic of reprisals is confirmed by
the rule of proportionality that restrains them."8 Because the act of
reprisal is intended to coerce, rather than to punish, it is, by its nature,
directed toward the innocent not the guilty.9
Thus, two characteristics of the law of reprisal must cause concern: the
persons acted upon will be innocent and the acts undertaken would be
otherwise illegal. The first characteristic is, however, limited by other
law of armed conflict rules. Some innocent persons, the sick, wounded,
and prisoners of war, are classified as protected persons and, as such, are
immune from reprisal as are some, if not all, civilians."' U.S. military law
limits reprisals to "enemy troops who have not yet fallen into the hands
of the forces making the reprisals."' This right is subject to the principle
of proportionality, which Walzer describes as a matter of adjusting means
to ends 2 and distinguishes'3 his backward looking views, which would
presumably limit the number of innocent targets to the number of war
crime victims, to the forward-looking "utilitarian" views of Myres
7. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 210 (1977).
8. Id. at 211; Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10, supra note 6, at 177.
9. If a contemporary Salahuddin were to cut his prisoner's throat, he would have
committed a grave breach of the law of war and is legally and morally responsible for his
crime. GREEN, supra note 5, at 45. If the murder of prisoners were permitted, the
doctrine of command responsibility imposes personal liability on all those accountable for
his actions. Id. at 303-04. Salahuddin and his commanders could be prosecuted as war
criminals. Id. at 309.
10. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the United States is a signator, and now
regarded by all authorities as customary international law binding on all states and, merely
guarantees civilians in occupied territory protection from reprisals. The 1977 Geneva
Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts adopted two protocols intended to
supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Provisions in the first of these protocols -
which the United States has refused to ratify - seek to extend protection from reprisal to
the entire civilian population. Arguably, extending protection to this new class of civilians
implies that they are not presently protected by customary international law. Compare L.
Lynn Hogue, Identifying Customary International Law of War in Protocol : A Proposed
Restatement, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 279 (1990), with Hans Gasser, Some Legal
Issues Concerning Ratification of the 1977 Geneva Protocol, in ARMED CONFLICT AND
THE NEW LAW 81, 92 (M. Meyer ed., 1989)(describing the proposal as "the most far
reaching innovation in the law on the conduct of military operations"). Whatever the
(slight) logical merits of such an argument, unrestricted bombing of the civilian population
or otherwise protected targets would be utterly inconsistent with United States values.
11. Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10, supra note 6, at 177.
12. WALZER, Supra note 7, at 210.
13. Id. at 211.
2001]
30 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 51:27
McDougal and Florentio Feliciano whose calculus would call for an
estimate of the number of innocent targets needed to prevent future
violations. 4 Whichever the calculus, my analysis leads to the conclusion
that U.S. authorities could respond to public demands for retaliation by
saying that the customary international law of reprisal would permit
attacks, targeting, and tactics that would otherwise be illegal, but the
right to do so is limited to opposing belligerent forces, however ill-
defined, and by the principle of proportionality.
If reprisals against belligerent forces are permitted, two questions
remain: what kinds of reprisals should be undertaken and what limits
does the law of war impose on them? Father Schall's essay, which
focuses on Aquinas' criteria for initiating a just war (/us ad bello) not
those for waging it (Gus in bello), causes us to reflect on both ends and
means. First, Aquinas wrote the Summa'5 for theologians, not princes,
nor journalists, nor an informed electorate. In 1270, about the time he
wrote, princes were at best marginally literate and certainly incapable of
engaging in the sort of casuistry, which is the hallmark of rigorous
Thomistic training. Presumably, a prince's Confessor was expected, by
both his ecclesiastical superiors and the prince, to aid the ruler in
deciding whether a martial undertaking met the moral criteria for a just
war. Jus ad bello criteria are relatively crude, the medieval equivalent of
a three-pronged Constitutional law test, but, when used by an artist like
Father Schall, are capable of ensuring a morally nuanced and rationally
satisfying conclusion which can be understood by our modern princes,
the media, and the voters.
What of jus in bello? Its doctrinal history can be traced to Gratian's
Decretum, completed about 1140, which incorporated St. Isadore of
Seville's (ca. 560-636) descriptive analysis of the law of war. " The most
comprehensive early treatment of reprisals is found in Giovanni da
Legnano's De Bello, De Represalis et De Duello "Of War, Reprisals and
Duels,"" written in Bologna in 1370, which distinguishes the classes of
14. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF WAR: TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 682 (1961).
15. In doing so he incorporated Augustine's Fourth Century views on the morality of
war. R.A. Markus, St. Augustine's Views on the 'Just War,' in THE CHURCH AND WAR 1-
16 (W.J. Sheils ed., 1983).
16. James A. Brundage, The Limits of War-Making Power: The Contribution of
Medieval Canonists, in PEACE IN A NUCLEAR AGE: THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER IN
PERSPECTIVE 73-75 (Charles J. Reid, Jr. ed., 1986).
17. GIOVANNI DE LEGANO, TRACTATUS: DE BELLO, DE REPRESALIIS ET DE
DUELLO 307-33 (Thomas Erskine Holland ed., 1917); JAMES MULDOON, POPES,
LAWYERS AND INFIDELS 21-22 (1979); Brundage, supra note 16.
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persons against whom reprisals may be directed but which offers no
guidance as to the kinds of otherwise forbidden acts which would be
permitted in reprisal. Secondary literature indicates that subsequent
medieval commentators distinguished between the means of warfare that
could legitimately be used when the enemy force was not Christian and,
in Christian lands at least, between combatants and non-combatants.
The medieval Church's efforts to regulate the weapons of war ultimately
failed.18 A recent summary of contemporary practice and opinio juris
sets out the three traditional criteria for judging any act of reprisal:
military necessity, humanity, and proportionality. 9 These principles
could be applied both to otherwise forbidden tactics, e.g., perfidy,
feigning surrender or incapacitation, 0 or weapons, e.g., gas or expanding
bullets.
Of course the fundamental criterion for judging the legitimacy of any
act of reprisal is whether it will coerce the enemy into changing his
practices. This criterion assumes a rational opponent who recognizes
that his practice was illegal and who is capable of analyzing the costs of
continuing the practice in light of the acts of reprisal. Ingrid Detter De
Lupis offers a list of perfidious acts in her book The Law of War.2' In
primitive war many of these practices are traditional, improper use of a
white flag, pretending to-have wounded or civilian status or pretending
surrender, and their costs are assumed by the warriors who have
concluded that there is no marginal utility in renouncing them. Other
illegal practices, misuse of the opponent's uniform, Red Cross sign or
equivalent emblems or attacks on medical units, do not apply because
primitive warriors like the Afghans have no assets against which the act
could be directed. Since the act of reprisal cannot rely on illegal tactics in
response to deviations from law of armed conflict norms, it must utilize
otherwise forbidden weapons."
Commentators, of whom Professor De Lupis is representative, classify
weapons into three categories: nuclear, chemical/bacteriological, and
18. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the 'Historical
Development of the Law of War, 5 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 5 (1965).
19. Edward Kwakwa, Belligerent Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict, 27 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 49, 80 (1990).
20. See generally GREEN, supra note 5, at 144-46.
21. INGRID DETTER DE LuPis, THE LAW OF WAR 259-63 (1987).
22. The U.S. Army's Field Manual provides: "the employment by a belligerent of a
weapon the use of which is normally precluded by the law of war would constitute a lawful
reprisal for intentional mistreatment of prisoners of war held by the enemy." Dep't of the
Army, FM 27-10, supra note 6, at 177. The authors of the Manual do not explain why they
fail to discuss tactical deviations from the legal norm as potential reprisals.
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conventional. 2' The first two categories would have no application in an
Afghan scenario since they could not be directed solely at belligerents
nor would their use be accepted as humane by the United States and
international communities. If a lawful reprisal is to be directed against
primitive forces, the United States must, therefore, rely on conventional
weapons, "the use of which is normally precluded by the law of war., 24 If
a weapon's use is normally prohibited, cost and training considerations
will dictate that it not be part of the military's inventory of conventional
weapons, thus precluding its availability for exceptional use in reprisal.
Only two otherwise illegal weapons are reasonably available and could
be used with a minimum of training. The first of these is the expanding
or "Dum-Dum" bullet, originally designed for use against Afghani
tribesmen.2' Although soft nosed bullets are routinely used in law
enforcement and by hunters, they are not stocked by the military, thus
creating a logistics problem, and, in light of military firearms' different
characteristics" may not be usable in standard U.S. weapons. Moreover,
their use would be purely symbolic since primitive warriors would not
consider them more threatening than military rounds. Therefore,
blinding lasers remain the only readily available effective illegal weapons
which could be used in reprisal and on which U.S. troops have been or
could be easily trained.
For the purposes of this essay I will assume that blinding lasers can
cause unnecessary suffering and thus violate the customary law of armed
conflict. This assumption motivated a 1995 Review Conference of the
Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) to adopt Protocol IV
intended to bar their use if they were specifically designed for that
purpose. The protocol has been subsequently analyzed by authors expert
in the law of war 27 but neither they nor, apparently, the participants at
23. GREEN, supra note 5, at 31.
24. Dep't of the Army, FM 27-10, supra note 6, at 177. Conventional weapons are
typically banned on the grounds that they cause unnecessary suffering and thus fail the
humanity criterion. On these grounds napalm and flame throwers were opposed during
the UN Conventional Weapons Conference which produced the 1980 Convention on
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects. Three protocols were annexed: the first prohibited weapons intended to injure by
fragments indectable by X-ray; the second dealt with the use of mines and booby traps; the
third related to weapons which rely on fire. W.J. Fenrick, New Developments in the Law
Concerning the Use of Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 229,
248-49 (1981).
25. GREEN, supra note 5, at 31 n.76; Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The
Red Cross and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 705, 718 (1996).
26. Fenrick, supra note 24, at 250-51.
27. Burrus M. Carnahan & Marjorie Robertson, The Protocol on Blinding Laser
[Vol. 51:27
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the CCW discussed the potential of laser use in reprisal. Available
literature indicates that portable ground-based low-energy lasers have
been developed and deployed with U.S. Forces for target marking, range
finding, and have many other military uses as well.2 ' Although not
designed to blind, they are capable of doing so under some
circumstances. The Department of Defense has also developed high-
energy lasers for use in ballistic missile defense.29 Available literature
does not discuss the blinding capabilities of "Star Wars" lasers, some of
which are designed to operate from aerial platforms.
Although our knowledge is limited, laser weapons satisfy military
criteria; they are available and troops have been trained to use them.
Their use satisfies the legal criteria for reprisal: necessity, for without
some action, torture and murder would continue; humanity, because they
are non-lethal; and potentially proportional in terms of the harm inflicted
and the persons against whom the harm is directed. There remains a
fundamental objection to the use of reprisals against fanatic warriors:
that, unlike soldiers, neither they nor their leaders will fear death
sufficiently to be coerced to change their practices. The objection is a
sound one if the threat is death but the threat of irreversible blindness,
directed by an enemy at a distance,30 could cause warriors to change their
practices. Therefore, I recommend that the U.S. National Command
Authority announce that blinding lasers will be used in reprisal for
violations of the law of armed conflict. There are, of course, objections,
on prudential grounds, to my proposal. Neither space nor skill enables
me to list and analyze them. However, Father Schall's comments and his
opening quotation from Aquinas' De Bello oblige me to conclude with a
reminder that any retaliatory act, in order to be licit must be performed
with a right intention:
For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate
authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful
through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says: "The
Weapons: A New Direction for International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 484
(1996); Carnahan, supra note 25; Anne Peters, Blinding Laser Weapons: New Limits on the
Technology of Warfare, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 733 (1996); W. Hays Parks,
Memorandum of Law: Trauvaux Preparatoires and Legal Analysis of Blinding Laser
Weapons Protocol, 1997-JUN ARMY LAW. 33.
28. Peters, supra note 27, at 766 n.3.
29. Id. at 766 n.4.
30. In this regard, Col. Charles Dunlap (USAF) Kosovo, Casualty Aversion, and the
American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2000), effectively disposes
of arguments that it is not fair to kill an enemy at a distance if he cannot respond. The
Salahuddins of the world, while human, have no claim to fair treatment.
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passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an
unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of
power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in
war."
31
31. SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 2 (2d ed. 1920) (citing ST.
AUGUSTINE, CONTRA FAUSTUM, BOOK XXII 74).
[Vol. 51:27
